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We analyze the effect of growing up on welfare on young people’s involvement in a variety of 
social and health risks. Young people in welfare families are much more likely to take both 
social and health risks. Much of the apparent link between family welfare history and risk 
taking disappears, however, once we account for family structure and mothers’ decisions 
regarding their own risk taking and investment in their children. Interestingly, we find no 
significant effect of socio-economic status per se. Overall, we find no evidence that growing 
up on welfare causes young people to engage in risky behavior. 
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1.  Introduction 
Adolescence is often characterized as a time for taking chances.  Exploring one’s 
boundaries, participating in new activities, forming new social networks, and adopting 
unfamiliar roles are all a normal part of the transition to independent adulthood.  Most 
young people will successfully negotiate this transition.  After all, psychologists note, 
the ability to regulate intense emotions, distinguish feelings from facts, reason, make 
decisions, and solve problems also improves throughout adolescence (Brynes 2003; 
Smetana and Turiel 2003) implying that occasional experimentation does not 
necessarily lead to enduring problem behavior (Steinberg and Morris 2001).  At the 
same time, some adolescents will engage in a raft of risky behaviors that have 
potentially long-term consequences for their health and economic well-being (ABS 
2008; Gruber 2001a).  The consumption of alcohol, tobacco, or illicit substances, for 
example, is not only unhealthy, but in some cases addictive implying that the choices 
made while one is young may have permanent long-run health effects.  Similarly, the 
decision to participate in crime, run away from home, or engage in unprotected sex 
can have (perhaps unintended) consequences that limit young people’s options for 
completing their education and beginning a career.  Given this, it is particularly 
important for policy makers and researchers to identify those factors underlying 
adolescents’ decisions to take unhealthy and dangerous chances.
1 
  This paper contributes to a growing economics literature that seeks to 
understand the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and young people’s 
                                                 
1 Risk taking is relatively common among youths.  The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008) 
estimates, for example, that in 2007 one in five (19 percent) men and one in six (16 percent) women 
aged 18 – 24 reported engaging in regular risky/high risk drinking.  Moreover, this behavior appears to 
have important consequences.  Teenagers (15 – 19) have the highest hospital separation rates due to 
alcohol intoxication, while young people aged 20 – 24 are more likely than people in other age groups 
to appear in court charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  Transport deaths 
account for 31 percent of all deaths among those aged 15 – 24, but only one percent of all deaths 
among those over the age of 25.  2 
 
risky behavior.  Specifically, we use unique administrative data matched to survey 
data for 18-year olds and their mothers from the Youth in Focus (YIF) Project to 
estimate the effect of growing up on welfare on young people’s decisions to take a 
variety of social and health risks.   
We extend the previous literature in several important ways.  First, our 
administrative data allow us to construct measures of the timing and intensity of 
welfare receipt, not at a point in time, but over the course of a young person’s 
childhood.  This is important as youth outcomes are linked to both the timing and 
duration of disadvantage (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997; Berzin et al. 2006).   
Second, we pay particular attention to minimizing the potential for selectivity bias to 
confound interpretation of the effect of family welfare history on youths’ risk taking.  
Specifically, we begin by using our detailed survey data to estimate a series of models 
increasing in controls for demographic characteristics, family background, and 
parental behavior.  The inclusion of a comprehensive set of controls reduces the 
potential bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.
2  We then estimate a number of 
bivariate probit models in order to evaluate the sensitivity of our estimates to any 
remaining selection on unobserved characteristics.  Finally, by analyzing multiple 
social and health risks, we are able to assess whether certain family characteristics 
appear to be related to risk taking generally or are more closely linked to specific 
types of risk.  This goes some way towards allowing us to consider risky behavior in a 
more unified framework (see Gruber 2001b; Cardosa and Verner 2007).   
  Our results indicate that young people in welfare families are much more 
likely to take both social and health risks.  Much of this apparent link between family 
welfare history and risk taking disappears once we control for the effects of family 
                                                 
2  Painter and Levine (2000), Waldfogel et al. (2002), Ruhm (2004), Antecol and Bedard (2007), and 
Cardosa and Verner (2007) adopt a similar approach in analyzing youth outcomes. 3 
 
structure and mothers’ decisions regarding their own risk taking and investment in 
their children.  Interestingly, we find no significant effect of socio-economic status 
per se.  In some cases, welfare receipt continues to have a significant effect on risky 
behavior despite extensive controls.  However, sensitivity analysis indicates that this 
is likely to be the result of unobserved heterogeneity.  Overall, we find no evidence 
that growing up on welfare causes young people to engage in risky behavior.     
          
2.  Welfare and Risk Taking   
A large literature documents the way that a lack of financial resources, in particular 
family income, affects the life choices of children and adolescents.  Poverty and/or the 
receipt of welfare have been linked to a range of detrimental outcomes including 
lower cognitive ability and academic achievement, worse mental and physical health, 
delayed social development, and poorer labor market performance in early 
adulthood.
3  Poor adolescents also take more chances.  Young people from poor 
families are more likely to have early and unprotected sex, experience adolescent 
pregnancy, engage in delinquent acts, be arrested, and drop out of school (Duncan and 
Brooks-Gunn 1997; Haveman and Wolfe 1994; 1995; Harris and Marmer 1996).   
Clearly there is a case for being concerned about the effects of poverty on adolescent 
development including risk-taking behavior.  At the same time, although evidence is 
mounting regarding the differential effects of growing up in a work-reliant versus a 
welfare-reliant family on the outcomes of poor adolescents (Bizin et al. 2006; Levine 
and Zimmermann 2004; Peters and Mullis 1997; others), there remains much that we 
do not know about the effects of public assistance per se.  Most importantly, it is not 
                                                 
3 See Berzin et al. (2006), Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), Harris et al. (2002), Haveman and Wolfe 
(1994; 1995), Mayer (1997) for extensive reviews. 4 
 
at all clear that any correlation in welfare receipt and risk taking represents a causal 
relationship.
4    
Both the incidence and determinants of risk taking vary with gender.  Adolescent 
girls and boys appear to have different reactions to stressful events (especially within 
the family) leaving boys more likely than girls to engage in a range of risky behaviors, 
while girls are often over-represented among those with depression, anxiety, or 
somatic complaints (see Abbott-Chapman et al. 2008).  Among adolescent boys, risk 
taking is mainly related to orientation towards their peer group, however, for 
adolescent girls risky behavior is more closely linked to their relationships with their 
parents (Michael and Ben-Zur 2007). 
The propensity for taking risks is also related to a number of other demographic 
and family characteristics.  Firstborns have a lower propensity for risky behavior than 
do those with a higher birth order (Argys et al. 2006), while spending more time 
living with a biological father appears to reduce risk taking (Antecol and Bedard 
2007).  Not surprisingly, young people are also influenced by the risks their parents 
take.  A number of studies, for example, suggest that there is a strong relationship 
between parental tobacco or alcohol consumption and the uptake of smoking and 
drinking by adolescents (see Bantle and Haisken-DeNew 2002; Powell and 
Chaloupka 2005; Li et al. 2002; Su et al. 1997).  More surprising is the finding that 
parental risk taking in the form of smoking, drinking, or not using seat belts can also 
be linked to unrelated risks such as adolescent sexual activity (Wilder and Watt 2002).  
Finally, previous research suggests that affective and supportive parenting can 
                                                 
4 In particular, it is important to account for the potential endogeneity of welfare receipt.  Exploiting 
instrumental variables, sibling differences, and child-specific effects, Levine and Zimmerman (2004), 
for example, find little evidence that maternal welfare receipt has a causal effect in reducing cognitive 
ability or leading to behavior problems.  Similarly, once endogeneity is taken into account, Peters and 
Mullis (1997) find a negative effect of welfare only on labor market outcomes.  Moreover, welfare is 
estimated to have a positive effect on achievement test scores and completed education for black 
adolescents.   5 
 
mitigate the negative consequences of socio-economic disadvantage (Harris and 
Marmer 1996; Hanson et al. 1997) and it seems reasonable to expect that the number 
and types of chances that adolescents take will also be related to the parenting they 
experience. 
After calls for an expanded research agenda surrounding youth risk taking (Gruber 
2001b), the nature of the relationship between alternative forms of risky behavior has 
begun to receive more attention from  researchers.  The concern is that the act of 
engaging in one risky behavior (say binge drinking) may lead to an increased 
tendency to take other risks (for example, to engage in unprotected sex) compounding 
the cost of making a bad choice.  Although the presence of a strong correlation in risk 
behaviors has been well established in the literature,
5 the potential for reverse 
causality and unobserved heterogeneity makes estimating the causal effect of one risk 
behavior on another methodologically challenging.  Rees et al. (2001) note, however, 
that overcoming this methodological hurtle is fundamental for the design of sensible 
policy.  On one hand, a causal relationship could imply that initiatives that were 
successful in reducing substance abuse would have far-reaching benefits by reducing 
unplanned pregnancies and sexually-transmitted diseases as well. On the other hand, 
if the correlation in risk behaviors stems from unobserved heterogeneity in the 
propensity for taking risk generally, it is possible that policies which raise the costs of 
one form of risk taking may have unintended consequences as youth substitute 
another.   
While the methodological issues continue to be debated (see Rashad and Kaestner 
2004), most researchers agree that to date there is little evidence of a causal link 
between alternative forms of risk (Grossman and Markowitz 2005; Grossman et al. 
                                                 
5 Rashad and Kaestner (2004) and Grossman et al. (2002) review the literature which links drug and 
alcohol use to sexual activity, while Harris et al. (2002) discusses the literature linking illicit drugs, 
delinquent behavior, and violence.   6 
 
2002; Rashad and Kaestner 2004; Rees et al. 2001; Sen 2002).  Rather the observed 
correlation in a variety of social and health risks seems to stem from individual-
specific differences in the propensity to take risks.  This suggests that more progress 
might be made by analyzing a large number of risk-taking behaviors simultaneously.  
Consequently, this paper contributes to a small, but growing, literature which seeks to 
examine a broad range of risky behaviors in a unified framework (see Antecol and 
Bedard 2007; Cardosa and Verner 2008).    
 
3.  Estimation Strategy 
We begin with a simple conceptual framework in which a young people’s decisions to 
take chances are driven by the anticipated costs and benefits of their actions.
6  In 
particular, if at time t an individual chooses to engage in some risky behavior (say, 
consume illicit drugs) with probability  t p  a bad outcome occurs (say, an overdose) 
leading to a discounted, life-time utility of 
B
t U .  With probability ( t p − 1 ), however, a 
bad outcome does not occur resulting in a discounted, life-time utility of 
NB
t U .  






t t U U p U p > − + ) 1 (      ( 1 )  
where 
A
t U  represents the discounted, life-time utility associated with not engaging in 






t U U U < < .  In this context, 
growing up on welfare could influence risk taking either by altering payoffs (for 
example, by lowering 
A
t U ) or by affecting the probability that a bad outcome occurs 
(perhaps because health services are worse in welfare neighborhoods).  Of course, 
youths are unlikely to know  t p  with certainty.  Moreover, the calculation of the life-
                                                 
6 This framework builds on the seminal work of Becker (1968) and has been widely adopted in the 
literature on crime and risk taking more generally. 7 
 
time, discounted utility associated with various alternatives is complex involving both 
discount rates as well as expectations about the time path of future costs and benefits.  
These complexities open up the possibility that a family history of welfare receipt 
may also influence risky behavior by affecting youths’ perceptions of risk, time 
preferences, or even the ability to rationally compare the future tradeoffs inherent in 
current choices.
7           
  Although the discussion has been useful in highlighting the numerous ways in 
which growing up on welfare might influence young people’s decisions to take risks, 
we are unable to estimate equation (1) directly.  We therefore focus attention on the 
following reduced form model of young people’s propensity for risk-taking behavior 
* () ij Y : 
*
ij i j i j ij YW X α βδ ε = +++  (2) 
where i indexes individuals,  j = 1 … 6 indexes our measures of social and health risk, 
i W  captures the timing and intensity of the family’s welfare receipt while the young 
person was growing up,  i X  is a vector of controls for demographic, family 
background, and parenting characteristics that are related to risk taking, and α, β, δ 
are parameters to be estimated.  In this framework, β ˆ captures the total direct effect of 
welfare on risk taking through all its various channels.  Finally,  ij ij i e ε μ = +  where i μ  
reflects the effects of individual- or family-specific factors otherwise not accounted 
for in the model and  ij e  is a random error term.   
  The propensity to engage in risk is unobserved, so we create an indicator variable 
reflecting the incidence of reported risk taking.  Specifically, 
                                                 
7 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) review the recent literature that combines psychology and economics 
in an effort to understand the risky behavior of youth. 8 
 
Pr( 1) Pr( 0) ( ) ij i j i j ij YW X Q β δε γ == + + >= Φ     ( 3 )  
where ( , ) ii QW X = ,  (,) γ βδ =  are parameters to be estimated and Φ is the standard 
normal cumulative density function.  Finally, we assume that ~( 0 , 1 ) ij N ε . 
  The primary methodological difficulty in estimating equation (3) is to isolate 
the exogenous effects of welfare histories from the effects of unobserved family-
specific factors ( i μ ) that are correlated with both the family’s welfare receipt (for 
example, poverty or socio-economic status) and the youth’s propensity to take risks.  
In particular, in a model with a limited set of controls in i X , the omission of important 
family-background characteristics could result in  (,)0 ii j COV W ε ≠ .  This would 
imply that standard regression techniques will produce biased estimates of the effect 
of growing up on welfare on risky behavior ˆ () j β .   
We have several strategies for dealing with this potential problem.  First, we 
use the detail of the Youth in Focus data to control for an extensive set of 
demographic, family background and parenting variables (see the discussion below) 
in order to ensure that (conditional on  i X )  i W  is orthogonal to ij ε .  Previous 
researchers have adopted a similar approach in analyzing the determinants of youth 
outcomes more generally (Painter and Levine 2000; Waldfogel et al. 2002; Ruhm 
2004; Antecol and Bedard 2007; and Cardosa and Verner 2007).  Second, we estimate 
bivariate probit models that account for the possible correlation in the unobserved 
determinants of a youth’s risky behavior and his or her family’s welfare history.   
Following Maurin (2002), these models are identified using information about the 
socio-economic status of grandparents (as reported by parents) as exclusion 
restrictions.  Finally, we adopt an empirical approach recently proposed by Altonji et 9 
 
al. (2005; 2008) to gauge the sensitivity of our results to varying degrees of selection 
on unobserved characteristics.  
    
4.  The Youth in Focus Data  
We use data from the Youth in Focus project (YIF) to estimate the relationship 
between a young person’s decision to engage in risky behavior and the socio-
economic disadvantage he or she experienced while growing up.
8  Our measure of 
socio-economic disadvantage is derived from the timing and intensity of his or her 
family’s welfare receipt (see the discussion below).  The YIF data are unique in 
providing detailed information about welfare histories, family background and 
parental behavior for a matched sample of mothers and their 18-year-old children. 
 
(i)  The Estimation Sample: 
Specifically, the YIF Project uses Australian administrative social security records to 
identify all young people born in the six-month period between October 1987 and 
March 1988 who ever had contact with the social security system between 1993 and 
2005 (see Breunig et al. 2007 for details).  The Australian social security system is 
nearly universal for families with children with some payments such as the Child Care 
Benefit having no income test at all and others, such as the Family Tax Benefit, being 
denied only to families in the top quintile of the income distribution.
9  At the other 
extreme are welfare payments that are targeted towards low-income parents (mainly 
single parents) or unemployed individuals which are also subject to income, asset 
and/or activity tests.  Young people can appear in the administrative data if they 
                                                 
8 For more information about the project see http://youthinfocus.anu.edu.au. 
9 The Family Tax Benefit is essentially an income tax credit to families with children. Currently, a 
family with two children would receive a Family Tax Benefit for incomes up to $105,000 AUD.  See 
Centrelink (2007) for more information about the Australian social security system. 
 10 
 
receive benefits themselves. Most, however, appear in the data because a family 
member (usually a parent) received a payment at some point between 1993 and 2005 
which depended in part on his or her relationship to the youth.  Comparisons of the 
number of young adults in these administrative data to census data suggests that over 
98 percent of young people born between October 1987 and March 1988 are 
represented in the administrative data (Breunig et al. 2007).  Thus, these social 
security records provide high-quality, fortnightly data on the payment details for the 
universe of Australians receiving a wide range of social benefits.   
  We summarize a family's welfare history by using the administrative data to 
categorize youths and their parents into one of six groups depending on the timing and 
intensity of the family's welfare receipt.  The Australian government does not 
consider either the Family Tax Benefit or the Child Care Benefit to be welfare 
payments—a perspective which we also adopt.  To place these payments in context, 
similar benefits in the United States are provided to families through the U.S. tax 
system in the form of standard deductions for dependent children and child care 
rebates.  Fully 40.9 percent of families with children never receive welfare benefits 
and appear in the administrative data only through their family tax and child care 
benefit records.   
At the other extreme are the 27.5 percent of families that received a welfare 
payment for a total of six years or more (who we classify as having had an intensive 
exposure to welfare) and the 31.6 percent of families that had more limited exposure 
to the welfare system at some point in the previous 12 years (see Appendix Table 1 
for more details).  The most common welfare benefits in this population are benefits 
for the unemployed or low-income parents.  Specifically, unemployment benefits 
(Newstart Allowance), payments to low-income parents with children (Parenting 11 
 
Payment Single or Parenting Payment Partnered), and disability payments (Disability 
Support Pension) are targeted towards the poor and are considered to be welfare.  In 
particular, unlike the case in the United States, in Australia unemployment benefits 
represent welfare rather than an insurance scheme.  Newstart Allowance is income-, 
asset-, and activity-tested and is not time-limited or related to an individual’s previous 
earnings history (Centrelink 2007).   
A stratified random sample of young people and a corresponding parent or 
guardian—in 96.5 percent of cases the biological mother—was selected from the 
administrative data for interview.  Data from separate phone interviews with youths 
and their parents as well as a self-completion questionnaire administered to youth 
were then matched to the administrative social security data.
10 
  We have necessarily made a number of sample restrictions.  We drop 74 pairs 
in which the responding parent was not the biological mother and 504 pairs in which 
the youth did not complete a self-completion questionnaire or in which either the 
youth or the mother provided incomplete information. Consequently, our estimation 
sample consists of 1852 pairs of youths and their mothers who both have complete 
survey information for the variables of interest.
11  
                                                 
10 The survey response rate was 36.4 percent for parents, and 36.1 percent for youth—73.1 percent of 
whom also completed the self-completion questionnaire.  More than 96 percent of young people and 92 
percent of parents completing the survey consented to having this information linked to their 
administrative records. 
11 Following best practice (Groves et al. 2004), approach letters, incentive payments, repeated call 
backs, and Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) were all used to maximise response 
rates. Although the final response rate differed somewhat across strata – ranging from approximately 
40 percent in stratum A to 31 percent in stratum B – these differences stem primarily from differences 
in contact rates rather than refusal rates (Breunig et al. 2007).  We investigated the potential for survey 
non-response and sample selection to bias our estimates of the effect of welfare history on risky 
behavior.  First, we analysed our administrative data to assess whether the observed characteristics of 
youths who have completed the survey were different from those who refused to participate or were 
uncontactable. The results indicate that the youths receiving public assistance (specifically Youth 
Allowance) and youths living in urban areas are somewhat over-represented in our sample.  To the 
extent that risk is higher in urban areas, this may lead our estimates to overstate the effect of socio-
economic disadvantage on risky behavior.  Second, we considered a somewhat narrower question of 
whether the youths who returned the self-completion questionnaire (SCQ) are likely to be different to 
those who did not. Since all of our measures of risky behavior are taken from the SCQ, we cannot 12 
 
 
(ii)  Measuring Risk-Taking Behavior and Classifying Family Welfare History 
The youths in our sample were asked a series of questions about a range of social and 
health risks that they may have taken while growing up.  Specifically, individuals 
were asked whether they had ever: 1) run away from home; 2) been in trouble with 
police (attended juvenile court); 3) hung out with a bad crowd; 4) smoked cigarettes;  
and 5) tried marijuana.  In addition, information was collected about the amount and 
frequency of alcohol consumption allowing us to construct a measure of risky 
drinking.
12  Indicator variables ( i Y ) constructed from respondents’ reports of these six 
risky behaviors form the basis of our analysis.   
We classify young people on the basis of their families’ welfare histories as 
follows: 1) those in families with no history of welfare (non-recipients); 2) those in 
families that received welfare for more than six years while the youth was growing up 
(intensive support); 3) those in families receiving less than six years of support after 
1998 (late moderate support); and 4) those in families receiving less than six years of 
support some of which occurred before 1998 (early moderate support).  This 
categorization allows us to make comparisons between those receiving intensive, 
moderate, and no welfare as well as to consider the relative importance of exposure to 
                                                                                                                                            
directly assess any possible differences in risk-taking of those who did not complete the SCQ. 
However, the main survey contained one question on regular smoking behavior.  Using this 
information, we find no evidence that girls who did not provide a SCQ are any different in their 
smoking behavior than girls who did. Boys who returned the SCQ were significantly less likely to be 
smokers, however, this can be captured by a simple shift parameter.  There is no significant interaction 
between the smoking indicator and other characteristics. Taken together, we believe that these results 
indicate that there is little reason to believe that we have understated the effect of growing up on 
welfare on the propensity to take risks.   
12 High-risk drinking for young people is defined so as to reflect Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council (2001) guidelines as closely as possible.  Women are considered high-risk 
drinkers if they consumer seven or more standard drinks per occasion, no matter how frequently; or 
five – six drinks at least five days per week.  Men are considered high-risk drinkers if they consume 11 
or more standard drinks per occasion, no matter how frequently; nine or ten standard drinks at least five 
days per week; or seven or more drinks every day.  13 
 
moderate welfare early in life (before the youth was 10 years old) and exposure to 
moderate welfare later in life (after age 10).
13    
Table 1 documents risk-taking behavior of the 18-year olds in our sample.
14  
There are striking disparities in the incidence of social and health risk taking among 
youth growing up in different socio-economic circumstances.  Young people in 
families with a history of intensive welfare receipt are significantly more likely than 
those in non-welfare families to have taken a wide range of social and health risks 
while growing up.  For example, one in five youths in intensive welfare families have 
ever run away from home, while fully 40.4 percent have tried marijuana.  The 
incidence of running away (11.7 percent) and marijuana use (32.1 percent) is 
substantially lower among youths in families with no history of welfare receipt.  In 
fact, the disparity in risky behavior between these two groups of young Australians is 
substantial (and statistically significant) irrespective of the measure of social and 
health risk that we consider.  At the same time, there are no significant differences in 
the risk taking of young people whose families received moderate welfare after the 
age of 10 and those who have never received welfare.  Those exposed to moderate 
welfare before the age of 10, however, are significantly more likely to have at some 
point hung out with a bad crowd, smoked cigarettes, or tried marijuana than youth in 
non-welfare families, though differences in other risk behaviors are not significant.  
Taken together, these results suggest that it is the intensity and timing of socio-
economic disadvantage, rather than its incidence, which is relevant for youths’ risk 
taking.   
Table 1 Here 
                                                 
13 In those families receiving intensive support, the first incidence of welfare receipt always occurs 
before 1998 when the child was aged 10. 
14 These results are weighted to take into account different sampling probabilities. 14 
 
There also appears to be a gender dimension to risk taking with young men being 
significantly less likely than young women to report ever hanging out with a bad 
crowd but significantly more likely to have ever been in trouble with police or 
attended juvenile court.  Moreover, the relationship between family welfare history 
and risk taking differs by gender.  The gender gap in hanging out with a bad crowd is 
concentrated among young people in non-welfare families for example.  The 
descriptive results discussed above suggest that the link between socio-economic 
disadvantage and risky behavior is complex and appears to depend on both gender 
and the nature (i.e., intensity and timing) of disadvantage experienced.   
 
5.  Estimation Results 
We begin by repeatedly estimating equation (3) with expanding sets of controls in 
order to gauge the sensitivity of the estimated effect of family welfare history to the 
inclusion of additional determinants of risk taking.  Stability of these estimates would 
provide some reassurance that the conditional independence assumption (i.e.   
(,)0 ii j COV W ε = ) required to identify any causal effect of welfare history on risky 
behavior is justified.  Our goal is to account for those factors underlying a youth’s 
propensity to engage in risky behavior (see Section 2 for a review) which may also be 
related to his or her family welfare history.  At the same time, we wish to avoid the 
inclusion of endogenous regressors which themselves are determined by a family’s 
welfare history (see Ruhm 2004).   
Given this, we consider three alternative specifications.  The first controls only 
for the demographic characteristics of the youth and his or her parents ( i X ).
15  The 
                                                 
15 Specifically, we include indicators for the following:  youth’s indigenous status, youth’s immigration 
status (separately by English-speaking background), urban residence, mother’s indigenous status, 
mother’s age, and whether either parent is an immigrant (separately by English-speaking background).      15 
 
second adds the controls for family background including family structure as well as 
the educational attainment and occupational status of both parents.
16  T h e  f i n a l  
specification also adds controls for whether parents read to the youth when he or she 
was young as well as mother’s risk taking behavior, i.e. smoking and risky drinking.
17   
Results (probit marginal effects and z-statistics) for the likelihood that young people 
have engaged in a variety of social (Table 2) and health risks (Table 3) while growing 
up are presented separately for young women (Panel A) and young men (Panel B).  
Summary statistics are provided in Appendix Table 1. 
 
(i)  The Impact of Family Welfare History  on Social Risks   
We find that having a family history of welfare receipt is generally associated with a 
significantly higher probability of engaging in social risk in the baseline model (see 
Table 2).  In particular, growing up in a family with a history of intensive welfare 
receipt is associated with a significantly higher propensity for young women to have 
run away from home (9.2 percentage points), been in trouble with police/attended 
juvenile court (13.6 percentage points), and have hung out with a bad crowd (9.9 
percentage points).  Young men growing up in welfare-intensive families also are 
substantially more likely to take these same risks though the magnitude of the effect 
differs across genders.  Clearly, the disparity in social risk across socio-economic 
groups observed in Table 1 is not due to differences in the demographic 
characteristics of youths or parents in these groups.  Moreover, the dearth of 
                                                 
16 This specification adds controls for the total number of children born to the youths’ mother as well as 
indicators for whether parents ever separated (separately by remarriage) and whether the youth ever 
lived without either parents.  Educational attainment (separately for each parent) is controlled using 
indicators of secondary school (12 years) completion, diploma/certificate, and a bachelor’s degree or 
more (the omitted category is less than 12 years).  Occupational status is captured through the ANUO4 
scale and we have included indicator variables for the lack of a reported occupation for both mothers 
and fathers (see Jones and McMillan 2000).   
17 In particular, we add indicator variables (0/1) for whether the youth reports that his or her parents 
ever read to them at night and whether the mother ever smoked or is a risky drinker.     16 
 
significant differences in the risk-taking behavior of youth growing up in families 
receiving moderate levels of receipt and those growing up in families receiving no 
welfare indicates that it is intensity rather than the incidence of welfare receipt that 
matters.   
Table 2 Here 
At the same time, the effect of intensive socio-economic disadvantage on social 
risk taking is substantially reduced (and is often eliminated) once we control for the 
effects of family background (see Column B).  Specifically, the estimated effect of 
intensive welfare on young women’s likelihood of having run away from home falls 
by more than half, while the effect on hanging out with a bad crowd essentially 
disappears.  Young women from welfare-intensive families do remain significantly 
more likely to have been in trouble with police once family background is accounted 
for, however the estimated effect (8.9 percentage points) is substantially smaller than 
when family background is omitted from the model (13.6 percentage points).   
Similarly, young men from welfare-intensive families continue to be significantly 
more likely to have been in trouble with police (9.1 percentage points) or to have 
hung out with a bad crowd (10.5 percentage points) despite the additional controls for 
family background.           
Once we add additional controls for parental behavior, we continue to find that 
intensive welfare receipt is associated with a substantially higher probability of 
engaging in some forms of social risk.  Young women in welfare-intensive families 
are 63.0 percent more likely than similar young women in non-welfare families to 
have been in trouble with police/attended juvenile court, while the incidence of 
police/court interactions among young men in welfare intensive families is 43.8 17 
 
percent higher.  Young men are also 62.3 percent more likely to report having hung 
out with a bad crowd if their families received intensive welfare assistance.   
Thus, although much of the disparity in the unconditional incidence of social 
risk taking stems from heterogeneity in family background and parental behavior 
across welfare categories, it appears that growing up in a family with a history of 
intensive welfare receipt is associated with taking certain social risks.  Interestingly, 
there are no significant differences in the risk taking behavior of young people with 
more moderate exposure to the welfare system suggesting that welfare intensity rather 
than welfare incidence is more closely linked to risk taking behavior.   
 
(ii)  The Impact of Family Welfare History on Health Risks 
Consistent with our analysis of social risks, in the baseline model intensive socio-
economic disadvantage is also associated with a higher likelihood of engaging in a 
number of health risks (see Column A Table 3).  Young women and men growing up 
in families with a history of intensive welfare receipt are substantially more likely to 
have ever smoked cigarettes (10.5 and 15.7 percentage points respectively) or tried 
marijuana (9.6 and 8.1 percentage points respectively), while young men in welfare 
intensive families are also more likely to report risky alcohol consumption (10.1 
percentage points).  Disparity in the taking of health risks across socio-economic 
groups is not explained by the characteristics of youths and parents in these families.
18   
Table 3 Here 
  The effect of having a family history of welfare on the likelihood that young 
women take chances with their health is completely eliminated once we control for 
family background, however (see Column B).  Similarly, there is no longer any effect 
                                                 
18 Note that the model for marijuana use also includes a control for living in South Australia, the ACT, 
Western Australia or the Northern Territory where marijuana use has been decriminalized for minor 
offences. 18 
 
of welfare receipt on the likelihood that young men have ever tried marijuana once we 
account for family structure as well as the educational attainment and occupational 
status of mothers and fathers.  On the other hand, young men in families with a 
history of intensive welfare receipt are substantially more likely to report risky 
alcohol consumption and ever smoking, although the effects are imprecisely estimated 
and only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  Adding controls for parental 
behavior reduces the estimated effect of having a welfare history on young men’s 
probability of ever having smoked somewhat (rendering it no longer significant), but 
leaves the effect on risky alcohol consumption more or less unchanged (see Column 
C). 
Taken together, these results provide at best mixed evidence that growing up on 
welfare is related to youths’ propensity to take health risks once we control for the 
effects of family background and parental behavior.  Only the effects on young men’s 
alcohol and cigarette consumption are large enough to be meaningful once detailed 
controls are added to the model.  But even here, our estimates are imprecise and not 
always significant at standard levels.  Overall, taking health risks appears to be more 
closely associated with disparity in family background and parental behavior than 
with welfare receipt per se. 
 
(iii)  The Impact of Family Background and Parental Behavior on Risky Behavior 
Before turning to our bivariate probit estimates of the effect of socio-economic 
disadvantage on risky behavior, we assess the ways in which family background and 
parental behavior are linked to youths’ propensity to take both social and health risks.  
In particular, Table 4 presents the remaining estimates from specification C—our 19 
 
most detailed model.
19  Marginal effects (and standard errors) are presented in the top 
part of the table, while results of standard F-tests of the joint significance of related 
variables are presented in the bottom of the table.     
Table 4 Here 
Consistent with Antecol and Bedard (2007), we find that youths, in particular 
adolescent girls, are more likely to take variety of social and health risks when their 
mothers separate from their natural fathers and do not repartner.  For example, young 
women are substantially more likely to have ever smoked (15.6 percentage points) or 
tried marijuana (11.6 percentage points) if their natural parents are not together and 
their mothers remain unpartnered.  It is important to note that these effects on young 
women’s behavior are both sizeable and widespread.  In particular, the estimated 
effect of having a single mother is insignificant only on young women’s probability of 
having been in trouble with police/attended juvenile court.  Among young men, living 
with a single mother is associated with a significantly higher probability of having 
hung out with a bad crowd, ever smoked cigarettes, or tried marijuana.  At the same 
time, we also find that having a stepfather in the household leads to more risk taking.  
Thus, our results confirm previous findings that growing up with one’s natural father 
decreases the propensity for risky behavior (Harris and Marmer 1996; Antecol and 
Bedard 2007).  
  Taken together our results indicate that family structure is an important 
determinant of youths’ propensity to take both health and social risks.  In particular, 
F-tests reveal that our measures of family structure are jointly significant in affecting 
risky behavior in 8 out of the 12 cases considered.  The exceptions are that family 
structure is not significantly related to the probability that either young men or young 
                                                 
19 Estimates of the effect of family welfare history from these models, although estimated jointly, are 
reported separately in Tables 2 and 3 for convenience. 20 
 
women report engaging in risky drinking.  Family structure is also not related to the 
likelihood that young women have had contact with the criminal justice system or that 
young men have run away from home.   
There is a much weaker relationship between a young person’s risky behavior 
and his or her family’s socio-economic status as measured by parents’ education and 
occupational status.  Specifically, having a mother with a high school degree (as 
opposed to a mother who left school before completing high school) is associated 
with a slightly lower probability that young women will have ever been in trouble 
with police/attended juvenile court or hung out with a bad crowd, while young women 
are more likely to have ever tried marijuana if their mothers are highly educated.  
However, there is no effect of maternal education on young women’s likelihood of 
engaging in other types of risky behavior and mothers’ educational attainment is not 
related to the risky behavior of their sons at all.  Rather, young men’s risk taking 
appears to be more closely linked to their fathers’ education.  Specifically, young men 
are less likely to run away from home or have been in trouble with police/attended 
juvenile court when their fathers have at least a Bachelor’s degree. Young women are 
less likely to smoke, and young men are more likely to drink, when their fathers 
completed high school rather than leaving school earlier.  These effects are often quite 
small, however, and F-tests indicate that parental education is never jointly significant 
in explaining youths’ risk taking.  
A young person’s propensity to engage in risky behavior is also not in general 
related to his or her parents’ occupational status.  Having a mother or father who does 
not report an occupation is associated with an increased propensity for youth, in 
particular young men, to report some risky behaviors.  However, our occupational 
status variables are generally not significant in explaining young people’s decisions to 21 
 
take risks.  The exception is that young men’s probability of running away from home 
is significantly related to their parent’s occupational status.   
Finally, we turn to the effects of parental behavior on the likelihood that young 
people take social and health risks.  We find that reading to children is linked to a 
lower propensity of risky behavior in adolescence.  In particular, young women whose 
parents read to them while they were young are less likely to have been in trouble 
with police/attended juvenile court by the time they turn 18, while young men are 
significantly less likely to have run away from home or hung out with a bad crowd if 
their parents read to them as a child.  It is unlikely that these results reflect the 
lingering effect of reading per se.  Rather, our parental reading variable to some 
degree controls for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity in parental involvement 
and supervision throughout childhood and adolescence.  Consistent with Wilder and 
Watt (2002), we also find that maternal smoking is associated with a substantial 
increase in adolescent risk taking generally.  Both young women and young men are 
significantly more likely to report having hung out with a bad crowd if their mothers 
ever smoked (6.8 and 5.4 percentage points respectively), while young women also 
have a higher probability of having been in trouble with police/attended juvenile court 
(5.2 percentage points).  Considered together, these measures of parental behavior are 
jointly significant in explaining young people’s decisions to take chances in 8 out of 
12 cases.  Thus, mothers’ decisions with respect to their own risk taking and the 
extent to which they invest in their children have important implications for the 





6.  Discussion:  The Potential Role of Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Thus far, our results indicate that much of the apparent link between growing up on 
welfare and young people’s propensity to engage in risky behavior disappears once 
we control for the effects of family structure, parental socio-economic status, and 
mothers’ own risk-taking behavior.  There are exceptions however.  Despite the 
extensive list of controls, having a family history of intensive welfare receipt 
continues to be associated with a significantly higher probability that young women 
have ever been in trouble with police (or attended juvenile court) and that young men 
have been in trouble with police, hung out with a bad crowd, or engaged in high-risk 
drinking.  In addition, there is a sizeable positive effect of intensive welfare receipt on 
young men’s smoking behavior, though the effect is not quite significant at 10 
percent.  Thus, it is important to assess whether there is evidence that any of the effect 
of family welfare history on these outcomes is causal.   
We use two alternative approaches to address this issue.  First, we estimate 
bivariate probit models to account for any unobserved, family-specific heterogeneity 
affecting both youths’ risk taking and their families’ propensity to have a history of 
intensive welfare receipt.  In particular, our data provide us with limited information 
about the socio-economic status of grandparents (as reported by mothers).  We use 
this information as exclusion restrictions in models in which the socio-economic 
status of the older generation affects the outcomes of their children (i.e. mothers’ 
welfare histories) but not the outcomes of their grandchildren (i.e. youths’ risky 
behavior).
20   Second, we conduct two sensitivity tests suggested by Altonji et al. 
(2005; 2008) that can help us gauge the potential for selectivity on unobserved 
characteristics to be driving our results.  
                                                 
20 Maurin (2002) also uses information about grandparents to estimate the effect of parental income on 
children's school performance. 23 
 
Selected bivariate probit results are presented in Table 5.
21  Our measures of 
the grandparent’s socio-economic status—i.e., the grandfather’s occupational status, 
an indicator of whether the family took regular vacations when the mother was aged 
14, and indicators for having a deceased parent at age 14—are generally significant in 
predicting whether or not the mother has a history of intensive welfare receipt.  The 
relationship is weak, however, suggesting that our exclusion restrictions may not be 
particularly powerful limiting the strength of the conclusions to be drawn (see Rashad 
and Kaestner 2004).  Nonetheless, we find that having a family history of intensive 
welfare is not associated with increased risk taking once we account for correlation in 
risk taking and family welfare histories.
22  We reach similar conclusions when we 
consider the effect of any welfare history on youths’ risky behavior. 
Table 5 Here 
Given the weakness of our exclusion restrictions, it is also useful to conduct 
the sensitivity analysis suggested by Altonji et al. (2005; 2008).  Their approach 
provides an informal method for investigating the importance of selectivity bias when 
good instruments are not available.  We first estimate a series of bivariate probit 
models making alternative assumptions about the magnitude ofρ , the correlation in 
the error components of the welfare history and risky behavior equations.  Assuming 
that  0 ρ =  is equivalent to estimating a single-equation probit model of risk taking 
assuming that welfare history is exogenous.  Higher values of ρ  are associated with 
                                                 
21 Specifically, we estimate bivariate probit models of the determinants of risky behavior using 
specification C and i) dropping indicators for moderate late and moderate early welfare receipt or ii) 
including an indicator of any welfare receipt.  These more parsimonious specifications of welfare 
receipt allow us to make the best use of our limited information about grandparents.  The results in 
Table 5 represent the models in which the excluded variables had the most power in predicting the 
family’s probability of receiving intensive welfare.   
22 The exception is that a family history of intensive welfare continues to have a positive effect on 
young men’s propensity to have hung out with a bad crowd.  In this case, however, the excluded 
variable (grandfather’s occupational status) is not significant in predicting welfare history.  A family 
history of intensive welfare receipt is estimated to reduce (rather than increase) the probability that 
young women report ever interacting with the criminal justice system.  24 
 
more correlation in the unobserved factors driving both risk taking and family welfare 
history.  These results are presented in Table 6.  We find that even a small amount of 
positive correlation, 0.1 ρ ≥ , is sufficient to completely eliminate the significant effect 
of family welfare history on risky behavior.  We next follow Altonji et al. (2005; 
2008) in calculating the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on 
observables that would be required to completely explain the estimated effect of 
family welfare history on youth risk taking (see Table 7).
23  We find that if selection 
on unobserved characteristics is only one third (0.369) as large as selection on the 
observed characteristics all of our results could be explained by selectivity bias.   
Taken together, the results of these sensitivity tests – like those of the bivariate probit 
models in Table 5 – strongly suggest that any effect of welfare history on youths’ risk 
taking that remains after controlling for family structure, parental socio-economic 
status, and mothers’ own risk-taking behavior (see Table 3) is not causal, but rather 
potentially stems from other factors not accounted for in the analysis. 
Tables 6 and 7 Here 
7.   Conclusions 
While most young people successfully negotiate the transition from adolescence to 
independent adulthood, some will participate in a range of risky activities that can 
have long-term consequences for their health, educational attainment, and labor 
market opportunities.  Those involved in the formation of social policy need to 
understand the ways in which economic and social disadvantage influence 
                                                 
23Altonji et al. (2005; 2008) observe that the relationship between the endogenous variable and the 
mean of the distribution of the index of unobservables is λ times as strong as the relationship between 
the endogenous variable and the mean of the observable index X’γ after adjusting for respective 
variances. Then, treating the binary variable model for the outcome variable as though the regression is 
carried out on the latent variable directly via the OLS and assuming that the OLS bias is close to the 
probit bias, they use the familiar formula for estimating a coefficient bias, which depends on the shift in 
unobservables. Finally, under the hypothesis that the true effect of the endogenous variable is 0, they 
are able to use the above observation find the value of λ. 25 
 
adolescents'  decisions  to  take  unhealthy  or  dangerous  chances.                              
In particular, the appropriate policy response relies heavily on identifying which 
mechanisms are causal and which reflect correlation in background factors (see Rees 
et al. 2001). 
  This paper uses data from the Youth in Focus project to estimate the effect of 
growing up on welfare on young people’s decisions to take a range of health and 
social risks.  We find that although 18-year olds in welfare families are much more 
likely to take both social and health risks this relationship appears to be mainly due to 
the effects of family structure and the decisions that mothers make regarding their 
own risk taking and investing in their children.  Socio-economic status per se has 
surprisingly little effect on a youth’s propensity to take chances.  In those instances in 
which welfare receipt continues to have a significant effect on risky behavior despite 
extensive controls it appears that this is most likely the result of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Overall, we find no evidence that growing up on welfare causes young 
people to engage in risky behavior. 
  These results lead to a number of important conclusions.  First, it seems clear 
that for Australian youth the issue is one of economic and social disadvantage in the 
form of poverty, family disruption, limited family functioning, etc. rather than the 
receipt of public benefits per se.  This is consistent with previous literature that finds 
that the source of income is relatively unimportant in understanding youths’ life 
chances once the endogeneity of public benefits is taken into account (for example, 
Peters and Mullis 1997; Levine and Zimmerman 2005; Berzin et al. 2006).  In the 
first instance, it seems sensible then for social policy to be centered squarely on 
providing adequate resources to families with children.       26 
 
  At the same time, it is also clear that financial resources are not a panacea to 
the problems associated with youth risk taking.  Previous researchers have argued that 
effective parenting—in particular the involvement of fathers—can to some extent 
protect young people from the effects of economic and socio-economic disadvantage 
(Harris and Marmer 1996; Hanson et al. 1997).  Policy initiatives that increased the 
employment of welfare mothers in the United States had positive consequences for 
younger children, but appear to have adversely affected adolescents—an effect which 
many have attributed to the reduction in the time that parents have to monitor and 
supervise their adolescent children (Gennetian 2004).  Our results certainly support a 
role for parental behavior and decisions in young people’s decisions to take risks with 
their own health and safety. This suggests that encouraging parents to adopt healthier 
life styles and become more effective parents may have positive consequences for 
their children as well.  
  Finally, despite the potentially long-term consequences of youths’ decisions to 
engage in risky behavior, there remains much that we do not know about why some 
young people successfully negotiate the experimentation often associated with 
adolescence and others do not.  Making progress in this area depends on future 
research initiatives that are specifically targeted towards the particular challenges that 
young people face.       
  27 
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Table 1  Risky behaviors of youth: summary of outcome variables 
 
 
a Means that are statistically different from the “no income support” category  at 5% level of significance 
are in bold. 















  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
All youth
a              
Ran away from home  0.149  0.36  0.148  0.36  0.120  0.33  0.194  0.40 0.146  0.35 0.144  0.35 
Got in trouble with 
police or attended 
juvenile court due to 
offending  0.163  0.37 0.159  0.37 0.104  0.31 0.252  0.43 0.142  0.35 0.152  0.36 
Hung out with a bad 
crowd  0.184  0.39 0.181  0.38 0.138  0.35 0.249  0.43 0.170  0.38 0.178  0.38 
High-risk  drinker  0.224  0.42 0.222  0.42 0.195  0.40 0.264  0.44 0.212  0.41 0.222  0.42 
Ever  smoked  0.295  0.46 0.290  0.45 0.233  0.42 0.358  0.48  0.307  0.46  0.302  0.46 
Ever tried marijuana  0.362  0.48  0.359  0.48  0.320  0.47  0.405  0.49 0.330  0.47 0.383  0.49 
No.  of  obs  1,675    1,675   550   469   212   444   
              
Girls              
Ran  away  from  home  0.167  0.37 0.165  0.37 0.135  0.34 0.216  0.41 0.190  0.39 0.147  0.35 
Got in trouble with 
police or attended 
juvenile court due to 
offending  0.122  0.33 0.119  0.32 0.072  0.26 0.197  0.40 0.086  0.28 0.121  0.33 
Hung out with a bad 
crowd  0.205  0.40 0.204  0.40 0.171  0.38 0.259  0.44 0.181  0.39 0.204  0.40 
High-risk  drinker  0.246  0.43 0.245  0.43 0.220  0.42 0.270  0.44 0.224  0.42 0.266  0.44 
Ever  smoked  0.309  0.46 0.306  0.46 0.263  0.44 0.355  0.48 0.319  0.47 0.317  0.47 
Ever  tried  marijuana  0.355  0.48 0.353  0.48 0.319  0.47 0.405  0.49 0.336  0.47 0.355  0.48 
No.  of  obs  921   921   304   259   116   242   
              
Boys
b              
Ran away from home  0.127  0.33  0.128  0.33 0.102  0.30 0.167  0.37 0.094  0.29 0.141  0.35 
Got in trouble with 
police or attended 
juvenile court due to 
offending  0.214  0.41  0.208  0.41  0.142  0.35  0.319  0.47  0.208  0.41  0.192  0.40 
Hung out with a bad 
crowd  0.158  0.36  0.154  0.36  0.098  0.30 0.238  0.43 0.156  0.36 0.152  0.36 
High-risk drinker  0.196  0.40  0.193  0.40 0.163  0.37 0.257  0.44 0.198  0.40 0.170  0.38 
Ever  smoked  0.277  0.45 0.271  0.44 0.195  0.40 0.362  0.48 0.292  0.46 0.289  0.45 
Ever  tried  marijuana  0.370  0.48 0.368  0.48 0.321  0.47 0.405  0.49 0.323  0.47 0.422  0.50 
No.  of  obs  754   754   246   210    96   202   
                    32 
 
Table 2  Socially risky behavior 
 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;
 * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
  Ran away from home  Got in trouble with police 
or attended juvenile court  Hung out with a bad crowd 
  (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
           
Girls:           
           
Intensive welfare  0.092




*** 0.017  0.001 
  (2.72) (1.07) (1.00) (4.27) (2.53) (2.18) (2.73) (0.41) (0.02) 
Moderate late welfare  0.062 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.002 -0.009 0.017  -0.015 -0.025 
  (1.42) (0.61) (0.55) (0.52) (0.05) (0.25) (0.36) (0.32) (0.55) 
Moderate early welfare  0.010 -0.005  -0.008  0.062
*  0.047 0.038 0.036 0.014 0.005 
  (0.31) (0.15) (0.24) (1.95) (1.47) (1.21) (0.99) (0.37) (0.15) 
           
Basic  youth  demographics  (8)  x x x x x x x x x 
           
Parental family structure (4)    x  x    x  x    x  x 
           
Parental  SES  (12)   x  x   x  x   x  x 
           
Parenting  (3)    x    x    x 
           
           
Boys:           
           
Intensive welfare  0.060







  (1.78) (0.92) (0.84) (4.19) (1.89) (1.87) (4.20) (2.38) (2.18) 
Moderate late welfare  -0.015 -0.032 -0.030 0.080  0.044 0.045 0.078 0.042 0.044 
  (0.36) (0.79) (0.74) (1.47) (0.80) (0.83) (1.56) (0.88) (0.91) 
Moderate early welfare  0.026 0.014 0.010 0.055 0.007 0.006 0.065
* 0.027  0.016 
  (0.79) (0.42) (0.31) (1.30) (0.17) (0.15) (1.67) (0.68) (0.41) 
           
Basic  youth  demographics  (8)  x x x x x x x x x 
           
Parental family structure (4)    x  x    x  x    x  x 
           
Parental  SES  (12)   x  x   x  x   x  x 
           
Parenting  (3)    x    x    x 
           33 
 
 
Table 3  Health-risk behavior 
 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;
 * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
  High-risk drinker  Smoker  Tried marijuana 
  (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) 
           
Girls:           
           
Intensive welfare  0.050  -0.013 -0.027 0.105
** -0.027  -0.047  0.096
** 0.010  -0.001 
  (1.33) (0.30) (0.63) (2.56) (0.58) (1.00) (2.28) (0.19) (0.02) 
Moderate late welfare  0.007  -0.032 -0.046 0.068  -0.004 -0.023 0.030  -0.006 -0.021 
  (0.14) (0.67) (0.96) (1.28) (0.07) (0.43) (0.55) (0.11) (0.38) 
Moderate early welfare  0.049 0.019 0.008 0.069
*  0.029 0.012 0.051 0.030 0.018 
  (1.29) (0.49) (0.20) (1.65) (0.68) (0.28) (1.19) (0.67) (0.41) 
Basic youth demographics (8)  x x x x x x x x x 
           
State decriminalised 
marijuana (1)         x  x  x 
           
Parental family structure (4)    x x   x x   x x 
           
Parental SES (12)    x x   x x   x x 
           
Parenting (3)    x    x    x 
           
           
Boys:           
           





* 0.085  0.081
* 0.020  0.001 
  (2.56) (1.80) (1.89) (3.47) (1.87) (1.59) (1.73) (0.36) (0.02) 
Moderate late welfare  0.060 0.032 0.031 0.104
* 0.048  0.060  0.002  -0.041 -0.033 
  (1.19) (0.63) (0.60) (1.80) (0.82) (1.01) (0.04) (0.66) (0.52) 
Moderate early welfare  0.017  -0.002 -0.001 0.081
* 0.031  0.014  0.095
** 0.061  0.045 
  (0.43) (0.04) (0.03) (1.79) (0.65) (0.30) (2.00) (1.23) (0.89) 
           
Basic youth demographics (8)  x x x x x x x x x 
           
State decriminalised 
marijuana (1)         x  x  x 
           
Parental family structure (4)    x x   x x   x x 
           
Parental SES (12)    x x   x x   x x 
           
Parenting (3)    x    x    x 
           34 
 
Table 4   Complete results for full specification (C) 
 








with a bad 
crowd 
High-risk 








with a bad 
crowd 
High-risk 
drinker  Smoker  Tried 
marijuana 
              
Indigenous  0.009 0.086 -0.124  0.114 0.060 0.368
***  -0.023 -0.018 -0.042 0.073  0.065  -0.083 
  (0.09) (0.99) (1.35) (0.98) (0.47) (2.68) (0.31) (0.19) (0.51) (0.72) (0.57) (0.69) 
Immigrant from non-
English speaking country  -0.061 -0.057 -0.091 -0.183
* -0.247
*** -0.264
***  0.029  -0.007 0.008  -0.036 0.032  0.037 
  (0.89) (1.01) (1.12) (1.83) (2.74) (2.64) (0.34) (0.07) (0.09) (0.36) (0.30) (0.31) 
Immigrant from English-
speaking country  -0.023  -0.010  -0.061 -0.066 -0.113 -0.158 0.057  0.319
*** 0.209
* -0.074 0.018  0.078 
  (0.30) (0.15) (0.71) (0.71) (1.17) (1.55) (0.66) (2.71) (1.93) (0.77) (0.16) (0.63) 
Lives in urban area  0.038  -0.009  0.004  -0.040 -0.010 -0.017 -0.010 -0.032 0.038  -0.060
** -0.011  -0.070
* 
  (1.48) (0.40) (0.16) (1.31) (0.31) (0.49) (0.42) (1.00) (1.37) (1.97) (0.30) (1.80) 
Either parent is migrant 
from non-English 
speaking country  -0.001  0.001  -0.077
** -0.078
*  -0.069 -0.050 -0.023 -0.029 -0.028 -0.116
*** 0.061  -0.012 
  (0.04) (0.05) (2.06) (1.92) (1.56) (1.07) (0.65) (0.65) (0.76) (2.74) (1.22) (0.21) 
Either parent is migrant 
from English-speaking 
country 0.040  -0.007  -0.029  -0.005 -0.047 0.016  0.048  -0.011 -0.057
* -0.049  0.022  0.013 
  (1.19) (0.26) (0.83) (0.13) (1.13) (0.37) (1.56) (0.27) (1.77) (1.32) (0.50) (0.26) 
Mother  Indigenous  -0.073  -0.011  0.013 0.070 0.005  -0.160   0.057  -0.089 -0.101 -0.100 -0.023 
  (0.74) (0.13) (0.10) (0.53) (0.03) (1.18)   (0.45) (0.89) (0.92) (0.77) (0.14) 
Mother’s  age    -0.000  0.002 0.002 0.005 0.009
*** 0.010
*** -0.004  -0.006
* 0.000  -0.003  -0.006
* -0.002 
  (0.03) (1.12) (0.66) (1.61) (2.71) (2.71) (1.55) (1.66) (0.16) (0.88) (1.66) (0.41) 
State decriminalised 
marijuana       0.073
*       0.049 
       (1.79)       (0.99) 
Family Background              
Total children (mother)  0.015
* 0.001  -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 0.017
* 0.025
** 0.009  -0.018  0.001  0.006 
  (1.66) (0.12) (0.07) (0.42) (0.36) (0.96) (1.94) (2.23) (0.92) (1.52) (0.05) (0.39) 
Mother did not remarry   0.075




** 0.044  0.033  0.064
* 0.046  0.092
* 0.096
* 
  (2.08) (1.06) (2.23) (1.71) (3.31) (2.39) (1.33) (0.78) (1.74) (1.12) (1.94) (1.87) 
Mother  remarried  0.015  0.069
* 0.112
** 0.008  0.104
* 0.145
** 0.010  0.086
*  0.047 0.002 0.075 0.137
** 
  (0.36) (1.88) (2.36) (0.16) (1.93) (2.56) (0.26) (1.67) (1.07) (0.04) (1.30) (2.19) 
Lived without parents  0.199
*** 0.048  0.188
*** 0.031  0.201
*** 0.066  0.063  0.286
*** 0.178
*** 0.015  0.266
*** 0.094 
  (3.92) (1.21) (3.42) (0.56) (3.15) (1.03) (1.13) (3.66) (2.66) (0.23) (3.19) (1.09) 
Mother’s highest 
education level:              
High school  -0.039  -0.068
* -0.091
*  0.033  -0.090 -0.041 -0.066 -0.088 -0.047 0.011  -0.060 0.095 
  (0.80) (1.80) (1.79) (0.57) (1.51) (0.63) (1.44) (1.54) (0.90) (0.18) (0.86) (1.21) 
Diploma or certificate  0.026  -0.012  0.015 0.034 -0.030  0.062 -0.003  -0.026 -0.006 -0.005 -0.016 0.057 35 
 
  (0.85) (0.51) (0.44) (0.96) (0.77) (1.50) (0.10) (0.71) (0.20) (0.14) (0.38) (1.23) 
Bachelor or higher  0.037  -0.006  0.042  -0.049  0.010  0.102
* -0.022 0.021  -0.018 -0.047 -0.018 0.049 
  (0.82) (0.16) (0.84) (0.96) (0.17) (1.65) (0.53) (0.37) (0.37) (0.89) (0.30) (0.71) 
Father’s highest 
education level:              
High  school  0.038 -0.015  0.025 0.012 -0.079
* -0.063  -0.011  -0.019  0.005  0.102
** 0.072  0.076 
  (0.98) (0.49) (0.58) (0.27) (1.66) (1.24) (0.36) (0.45) (0.12) (2.31) (1.46) (1.42) 
Diploma or certificate  -0.014  0.018 0.028 0.011 0.038 0.004 -0.033  0.011 -0.042  0.056 0.035 0.065 
  (0.43) (0.64) (0.77) (0.28) (0.89) (0.10) (1.08) (0.27) (1.19) (1.33) (0.74) (1.27) 
Bachelor or higher  0.016  -0.027 0.034  -0.016 0.008  0.012  -0.081
** -0.107
** -0.044  0.066  -0.002  -0.042 
  (0.36) (0.74) (0.69) (0.32) (0.14) (0.20) (2.31) (2.09) (1.02) (1.15) (0.03) (0.64) 
Mother’s occupation:              
SES – ANU4  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001 -0.000  -0.000 0.001  -0.001 0.001 -0.000  0.001 0.002
* 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.68) (0.49) (0.45) (0.91) (1.27) (0.95) (0.09) (1.13) (1.64) 
Occupation not reported  -0.093  -0.007  -0.024 -0.002 -0.033 -0.171 0.235
** -0.063  0.191
** 0.077  0.202
* 0.150 
  (1.22) (0.10) (0.28) (0.02) (0.31) (1.63) (2.51) (0.73) (1.97) (0.83) (1.83) (1.31) 
No occupation/ 
homemaker -0.121
*  -0.031  0.044 0.055 0.129 -0.022  0.052 -0.071  0.013 0.005 -0.127  -0.020 
  (1.94) (0.54) (0.51) (0.58) (1.26) (0.21) (0.61) (0.82) (0.16) (0.05) (1.19) (0.16) 
Father’s occupation:              
SES – ANU4  -0.000  0.000  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002
***  0.000 0.000 -0.002
** -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.40) (0.26) (1.25) (1.25) (1.59) (0.08) (3.25) (0.05) (0.58) (2.26) (0.65) (0.01) 
Occupation not reported  -0.009  0.064 0.092 -0.084  0.008 0.205
** 0.262
*** 0.006  0.143
* -0.049 -0.093 0.127 
  (0.15) (1.03) (1.20) (1.16) (0.09) (2.21) (3.11) (0.08) (1.81) (0.71) (1.15) (1.28) 
No occupation/ 
homemaker  -0.010 -0.062 0.078  -0.037 -0.133 0.180  0.150  -0.004 -0.103 -0.022 -0.098 0.167 
  (0.09) (0.77) (0.56) (0.27) (0.94) (0.98) (1.04) (0.03) (1.04) (0.16) (0.66) (0.74) 
Parenting:              
Parents read to youth at 






*  -0.025 -0.040 0.019  -0.011 -0.025 
  (1.59) (2.99) (1.76) (2.57) (4.07) (1.78) (1.80) (0.82) (1.50) (0.63) (0.32) (0.66) 





*** 0.037  0.012  0.060
** -0.025  0.148
*** 0.179
*** 
  (0.09) (2.30) (2.18) (2.58) (3.78) (3.38) (1.45) (0.36) (2.12) (0.81) (4.14) (4.59) 
Mother risky drinker  0.030  -0.049 -0.053 0.000  0.034  0.198
***  0.003 0.012 0.023 0.065 0.073 0.022 
  (0.59) (1.33) (1.03) (0.00) (0.53) (2.69) (0.05) (0.18) (0.41) (1.00) (0.97) (0.28) 
              
Observations  921 921 921 921 921 921 743 754 754 754 754 754 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.068 0.085 0.072 0.055 0.093 0.085 0.096 0.102 0.090 0.071 0.087 0.069 
F-test of joint 
significance 
54.00 54.00 63.26 49.91 95.35 92.25 49.43 72.69 55.26 48.15 71.77 64.77 
DF  30 30 30 30 30 31 29 30 30 30 30 31 
Prob  >  F  0.005 0.005 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.019 0.000 0.000 
              
F-tests of joint 
significance:
b 
            
Family structure (4)   23.745  6.331 23.081  3.933 25.042 13.468  6.788 22.688 12.280  3.922 15.763  8.400 
p-value  0.000 0.176 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.009 0.148 0.000 0.015 0.417 0.003 0.078 36 
 
Parental education and 
SES (12)  
9.798 7.473  12.636 7.929  14.625  17.956  22.837 11.580 11.953 13.256 10.720 15.492 
p-value  0.634 0.825 0.396 0.791 0.263 0.117 0.029 0.480 0.449 0.351 0.553 0.216 
Parental education (6)   3.961  5.426 6.483 4.528 8.260 7.800 8.854 8.291 3.602 6.557 3.281 7.599 
p-value  0.682 0.490 0.371 0.606 0.220 0.253 0.182 0.218 0.730 0.364 0.773 0.269 
Parental SES (6)   5.504  2.304  7.022 2.569 6.456 9.742  19.518 1.894 9.033 6.710 7.210 6.569 
p-value  0.481 0.890 0.319 0.861 0.374 0.136 0.003 0.929 0.172 0.348 0.302 0.363 
Parental investment (3)   3.084  15.696  8.840 14.239 33.587 25.687  5.755 0.874 7.581 1.899  19.756  22.798 
p-value  0.379 0.001 0.031 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.832 0.056 0.594 0.000 0.000 
              
 
a The absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses, while significance levels are indicated as follows: 
 * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
b Degrees of freedom in parenthesis. 37 
 
Table 5  Summary of IV estimation results 
 



















Rho  p-value on 
rho 
            
Girls police/juvenile            





0.027   10.14  0.758  0.009 
Any welfare use  0.674  0.92  Parent’s family went on 
holidays out of town  0.017 -2.38  5.66  -0.301 0.522 
             
Boys police/juvenile             
Intensive welfare use  0.409  0.59  Occupational status of 
grandfather
a  0.092 -1.68  2.83  -0.089 0.831 
Any welfare use  -0.402  -0.37  Parent’s family went on 
holidays out of town  0.075 -1.78  3.16  0.330 0.695 
             
Boys bad crowd             
Intensive welfare use  1.283  2.64  Occupational status of 
grandfather
a  0.138 -1.48  2.20  -0.578 0.198 
Any welfare use  Did not 
converge    Parent’s family went on 
holidays out of town        
             
Boys drinking             
Intensive welfare use  0.715  1.14  Occupational status of 
grandfather
a  0.093 -1.68  2.81  -0.253 0.522 
Any welfare use  -0.442  -0.49  Parent’s family went on 
holidays out of town  0.055 -1.92  3.69  0.337 0.547 
             
Boys smoking             
Intensive welfare use  -0.798  -0.99  Occupational status of 
grandfather
a  0.087 -1.71  2.93  0.592 0.285 
Any welfare use  -1.213  -2.93  Parent’s family went on 
holidays out of town  0.112 -1.59  2.53  0.808 0.249 
             
a Data used refer to mother’s parents when she was 14 years of age.  
Table 6  Sensitivity analysis: coefficient on welfare use in univariate probit and 









































































































































































































Standard errors in parenthesis; 
*significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%. 
   39
Table 7   The amount of selection of unobservables relative to selection on 




outcome)  Welfare use  Univariate 
probit estimate  Implied bias  Ratio of 
estimate to bias 
        
Girls 
police/juvenile  Any welfare receipt  0.212 
(0.144)  1.968 0.107 




(0.134)  2.400 0.127 
Boys 
police/juvenile  Any welfare receipt  0.168 
(0.136)  1.860 0.090 




(0.131)  2.172 0.119 
Boys bad crowd  Any welfare receipt  0.213 
(0.149)  2.020 0.106 




(0.141)  1.878 0.169 
Boys drinking  Any welfare receipt  0.118 
(0.135)  0.972 0.121 




(0.135)  0.784 0.369 
Boys smoking  Any welfare receipt  0.149 
(0.126)  2.173 0.069 
  Intensive welfare 
receipt 
0.189 
(0.126)  1.698 0.111 
        
 
Standard errors in parenthesis; 
*significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%.   40
Appendix table 1  Summary statistics for independent variables
a 
a Means and standard deviations are weighted according to the population (administrative dataset) weights except 
where indicated. 
b Unweighted means and standard deviations.
 
Variable  All respondents  Girls  Boys 
  Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Intensive welfare
b 0.280 0.45 0.281 0.45  0.279 0.45 
Moderate late welfare
b 0.127 0.33 0.126 0.33  0.127 0.33 
Moderate early welfare
b 0.265 0.44 0.263 0.44  0.268 0.44 
Basic youth demographics:        
Indigenous 0.027 0.16 0.028 0.16  0.026 0.16 
Migrant from non-English speaking country  0.032 0.18 0.032 0.18  0.032 0.18 
Migrant from English-speaking country  0.026 0.16 0.026 0.16  0.025 0.16 
Lives in major city  0.598 0.49 0.604 0.49  0.590 0.49 
Either parent is a migrant from non-English 
speaking country  0.186 0.39 0.188 0.39  0.183 0.39 
Either parent is a migrant from English-
speaking country  0.182 0.39 0.175 0.38  0.191 0.39 
Mother indigenous  0.016 0.13 0.018 0.13  0.014 0.12 
Mother’s age  29.803 4.80 29.894 4.82  29.687 4.76 
State decriminalized marijuana  0.197 0.40 0.217 0.41  0.171 0.38 
Family Background:        
Total children (mother)   3.016 1.29 2.987 1.28  3.050 1.29 
Mother did not remarry   0.180 0.38 0.176 0.38  0.185 0.39 
Mother  remarried  0.121 0.33 0.120 0.32  0.123 0.33 
Lived without parents  0.062 0.24 0.074 0.26  0.048 0.21 
Parental SES: mother’s highest education level:        
High school  0.081 0.27 0.082 0.27  0.080 0.27 
Diploma or certificate  0.435 0.50 0.418 0.49  0.454 0.50 
Bachelor or higher  0.198 0.40 0.191 0.39  0.206 0.41 
Parental SES: father’s highest education level:        
High school  0.151 0.36 0.137 0.34  0.169 0.38 
Diploma or certificate  0.245 0.43 0.261 0.44  0.225 0.42 
Bachelor or higher  0.187 0.39 0.195 0.40  0.177 0.38 
Parental SES: mother’s occupation:        
SES – ANU4  45.422 25.87 44.957 25.57  45.996 26.23 
Occupation not reported  0.030 0.17 0.027 0.16  0.032 0.18 
No occupation/ homemaker  0.031 0.17 0.034 0.18  0.027 0.16 
Parental SES: father’s occupation:        
SES – ANU4  44.048 25.08 44.054 25.14  44.016 25.04 
Occupation not reported  0.046 0.21 0.047 0.21  0.046 0.21 
No occupation/ homemaker  0.009 0.10 0.009 0.10  0.009 0.10 
Parenting:        
Parents read to youth at night  0.535 0.50 0.605 0.49  0.450 0.50 
Mother smoker  0.445 0.50 0.447 0.50  0.441 0.50 
Mother risky drinker  0.057 0.23 0.057 0.23  0.055 0.23 
        
No of obs  1,675   921   754  